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ABSTRACT 
The  premise  of  this  article  is  that  an  understanding  of  psychology  and  other  social  science 
disciplines can inform the effectiveness of the economic tools traditionally deployed in carrying 
out  the  functions  of  government,  which  include  remedying  market  failures,  redistributing 
income,  and  collecting  tax  revenue.  An  understanding  of  psychology  can  also  lead  to  the 
development of different policy tools that better motivate desired behavior change or that are 
more cost-effective than traditional policy tools. The article outlines a framework for thinking 
about the psychology of behavior change in the context of market failures. It then describes the 
research on the effects of a variety of interventions rooted in an understanding of psychology that 
have policy-relevant applications. The article concludes by discussing how an understanding of 
psychology can also inform the use and design of traditional policy tools for behavior change, 
such as financial incentives. 
 
 
Brigitte C. Madrian 
Harvard Kennedy School 
79 JFK Street  
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138 
and NBER  
brigitte_madrian@harvard.edu  
3 
“A lot of our policy models traditionally are based on a rather naïve 
understanding of what drives behavior. But if you have a more intelligent, 
nuanced account of how people make decisions, you can design policy that is 
more effective, less costly, and makes life easier for most citizens.” 
 —David Halpern, Director of the UK Behavioural Insights Team 
(quoted in Bell 2013) 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Market failures occur when markets, left to their own devices, generate an inefficient 
allocation of resources: In short, when Q ≠ Q* in the familiar Econ 101 graphs of supply and 
demand. A primary goal of public policy is to increase market efficiency by remedying market 
failures (to the extent possible). The typical taxonomy of market failures—public goods, 
externalities, information asymmetries, and market power—focuses on inefficiencies that relate 
to either market structure or the incentives of market participants and gives rise to policy tools 
designed to change either market structure or the incentives of market participants. The tools 
conventionally employed in this effort include shifting market prices through either taxes or 
subsidies, regulating output, and mandating information disclosure. The traditional analysis of 
market failures and the impact of public policy on market outcomes assumes that market 
actors—consumers and firms—are rational in their behavior, carefully weighing their own costs 
and benefits in making economic decisions. 
More recent research on behavioral economics highlights another potential source of 
market inefficiency: consumers’ cognitive limitations and psychological biases. Congdon et al. 
(2011) delineate three broad categories of psychological biases: imperfect optimization, bounded  
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self-control, and nonstandard preferences.
1  The first, imperfect optimization, arises because 
consumers have limited attention and cannot possibly focus on all of the information relevant for 
all of the decisions they are called upon to make. They have limited computational capacity, 
which leads them to apply simplifying heuristics to complicated choice problems. And their 
reasoning is often biased. The second, bounded self-control, is manifest in the discrepancy 
between the intentions consumers have and their actual behavior.  Consumers often plan to 
behave in a certain way but end up doing otherwise. They procrastinate, their choices may vary 
depending on their emotional state, and small barriers may in fact constitute significant 
deterrents to action. Finally, consumer preferences are often context dependent. Individuals 
exhibit a bias toward the status quo. Their choices are sensitive to how decisions are framed. 
They evaluate outcomes not in terms of absolutes but relative to (endogenous) reference points. 
Consumer preferences are also other regarding. Individuals care to some degree about others. 
They also care about what others think of them (and their choices). They adhere to social norms 
and are concerned about fairness. 
Cognitive bias does not necessarily imply market failure. Barr et al. (2013) note that in 
some contexts, firms may have incentives to help mitigate consumers’ behavioral biases and 
limit any resulting market failures. But firms may also exploit behavioral biases in ways that 
create or exacerbate market failures.  
A leading example of a behavioral bias that impedes market efficiency is present bias, or 
the tendency of individuals to place much less weight on the future relative to the present than 
would be predicted by standard models of time discounting. Present bias can lead individuals to 
make decisions today that reduce future welfare in ways that individuals will later regret (Strotz 
                                                 
1 DellaVigna (2009) articulates a slightly different categorization of these psychological biases.  
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1955, Laibson 1997). Analogous to an externality, the situation in which an individual’s decision 
in the moment creates negative future consequences is sometimes referred to as an internality. 
Present bias is posited as an explanation for behaviors ranging from a failure to save to smoking. 
These behaviors can constitute a market failure if there are social costs from individuals saving 
too little or smoking too much. 
The optimal response to market failures may also depend on psychological 
considerations. For example, Campbell et al. (2011) note that mandated information provision or 
disclosure is a policy tool often used to mitigate asymmetric information, reduce search costs and 
limit market power, and remedy the underprovision of information-based public goods. But the 
effectiveness of mandated information provision will be limited if consumers do not understand 
the information, believe that it is not relevant to their decision making, or do not know how to 
access or use it. Campbell et al. (2011) cite the following example: “If consumers mistakenly 
believe that they will pay their credit bill on time every month, clear and transparent disclosure 
of late fees and interest rates may not change behavior because consumers deem the information 
irrelevant at the time they make a purchase.” An understanding of psychology can thus inform 
how effective the tools traditionally deployed in the case of market failure will be. It can also 
lead us to the development of different policy tools that better motivate desired behavior change 
or that are more cost-effective than traditional policy tools. 
Efforts to incorporate behavioral economics into the design of more effective policy 
solutions are underway across the globe. The best known initiative on this front is the 
Behavioural Insights Team in the United Kingdom, more commonly referred to as the Nudge 
Unit, whose self-proclaimed mission is to apply “insights from academic research in behavioural 
economics and psychology to public policy and services” (for more information on the UK  
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Behavioral Insights Team, see https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/behavioural-
insights-team). The success of the Nudge Unit at devising, implementing, and testing new 
approaches to achieving policy goals in domains ranging from tax collection to unemployment to 
energy conservation has been widely touted. Several countries are using the UK Behavioural 
Insights Team as a model for their own efforts to implement more behaviorally informed 
approaches to policy design, including Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore, and the United States (Bell 2013, Subramanian 2013). 
This article uses the lens of behavioral economics to examine a range of tools at the 
disposal of policy makers to effect behavior change. I begin by setting up a framework for 
evaluating traditional versus behaviorally informed policy tools (Section 2). I then discuss an 
assortment of behaviorally informed policy tools and provide evidence on their impact drawn 
from a variety of different policy domains. These tools can be broadly categorized as tools that 
help individuals execute their stated preferences (Section 3) or tools that change either how 
individuals evaluate the costs versus the benefits of behavior change or how individuals evaluate 
their preferences (Section 4). Section 5 then considers how behavioral economics informs the use 
and design of one traditional policy tool—financial incentives. Section 6 concludes with a 
discussion of some of the factors that matter in evaluating which interventions are most 
appropriate in a given context. 
2. A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING POLICY TOOLS 
Consider first a market with a positive externality such as that for influenza vaccines. A 
traditional analysis of such a market would assume that all actors are fully rational and make 
decisions that maximize their own private benefit. An introductory economics textbook might 
depict the outcome in this market as shown in Figure 1.   
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1 shows the observed market demand curve, traditionally taken as the marginal private benefit 
to consumers from being vaccinated against the flu, whereas D
2 shows the marginal social 
benefit that accrues to society from vaccination. Because this is a market with a positive 
externality, D
2 lies above D
1. The socially optimal quantity of vaccines, Q*, equates the marginal 
cost of vaccines (as indicated by the supply curve, S) with their social marginal benefit, but this 
exceeds the quantity that will prevail in the private market, Q
1, when individuals make 
vaccination decisions purely on the basis of their own private marginal benefit. The triangle 
denoted DWL shows the social deadweight loss from the underprovision (relative to what is 
socially optimal) of flu vaccines in this market. 
The traditional policy tools that an introductory economics textbook would advocate in 
such a market are either (a) to subsidize vaccination (change the price) or (b) to mandate a  
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vaccination level equal to Q* (regulate the quantity). The first option, a subsidy, could be 
directed to either consumers or suppliers of the vaccine. In either case, the impact of the subsidy 
is to drive a wedge between the supply curve, S, and the observed demand curve, D
1, equal to the 
amount of the subsidy, s. Suppose the subsidy is given to consumers. Their private marginal 
benefit from vaccination now increases from its previous level by the amount of the subsidy. If 
the subsidy is set at its socially optimal level, the private marginal benefit curve shifts up from 
D
1 to D
2, and the new equilibrium is the socially optimal vaccination level, Q*. There is, 
however, a cost to provide the subsidy that moves the market from Q
1 to Q*. The subsidy, s, is 
paid to all consumers of the flu vaccine for a total cost equal to the area of rectangle ABCD in 
Figure 1. If funding this subsidy requires distortionary taxation, economic efficiency can be 
improved if there is a lower-cost way to shift vaccination demand to the socially optimal level. 
The traditional rational actor framework assumes that individuals make vaccination 
decisions by comparing the marginal benefit of vaccination with the marginal cost. If the private 
marginal benefit exceeds the private marginal cost, consumers get the vaccine; otherwise, they 
do not. In this framework, providing a subsidy to consumers increases their marginal benefit, 
while providing a subsidy to suppliers decreases the marginal cost. But there are other factors 
that also influence vaccine demand—the ceteris paribus in our economic models. One of these 
factors is the psychology that underlies how individuals do, or do not, think about decision tasks 
such as whether to get a flu vaccine. This is where insights from behavioral science can help 
shape more cost-effective public policy. Modifying the ceteris paribus may be a less expensive 
approach to behavior change than applying the policy tools traditionally wielded by economists. 
For example, although there may be a significant gap between Q* and Q
1, not all of that 
gap may result from a wedge between the private and social marginal benefit of vaccination. For  
9 
example, individuals may intend to get a flu vaccine but fail to follow through (e.g., their 
employer may offer a free workplace clinic, but they forget which day the clinic is open). In the 
context of Figure 1, there may be a much smaller wedge between the private marginal benefit 
and the social marginal benefit of getting a flu shot; rather, individuals may fail to act on their 
private marginal benefit because they are inattentive, and it is this inattention that drives most of 
the wedge between D
1 and D
2. In this scenario, D
3 is the true private marginal benefit curve, but 
D
1 is the demand curve that we observe; the difference between the two results from consumers’ 
inattention. Providing a subsidy may do little to change market outcomes in this case; if most 
consumers already perceive the marginal benefit as close to the marginal cost, further increasing 
the marginal benefit does not change the calculus about whether or not to get a flu shot. If 
attention is endogenous, then a subsidy may effect some behavior change by motivating greater 
vigilance about when and where the vaccination clinic will occur. But if attention is the primary 
problem, and the problem is not that the private marginal benefit is less than the marginal cost, 
there may be lower-cost policy interventions to redirect attention (the shift observed in demand 
from D
1 to D
3) and move the market equilibrium closer to Q*. Possible interventions that directly 
address the problem of attention include reminding individuals more frequently or making 
reminders more salient, encouraging individuals to make a concrete plan about when and where 
they will get their flu shot, and moving the vaccination clinic to a central location to increase 
visibility. The first two interventions are practically free; the third, changing the location of the 
vaccination clinic, may impose some costs, but these costs are potentially much lower than the 
costs of providing a subsidy to everyone who gets an influenza vaccine. 
Note that there may still be a role for traditional policy tools such as subsidies to change 
behavior. In reality, we may have heterogeneous consumers who vary both in their degree of  
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inattentiveness and in the extent to which they internalize the positive externalities of 
vaccination. For those individuals whose private marginal benefit is substantially lower than 
their marginal cost, interventions to remind or help them plan to get vaccinated are unlikely to 
change behavior because they fail to make vaccination attractive. In this case, a policy 
intervention that changes the individual cost-benefit calculus is needed. A subsidy to consumers 
will make getting the flu shot more attractive by increasing the private marginal benefit. 
Similarly, a subsidy to providers will decrease the marginal cost and make it more likely that the 
benefit to consumers of vaccination exceeds the cost. If part of the cost of getting a flu shot is the 
time cost of getting to the vaccination clinic, then moving the clinic to a central location is an 
intervention that potentially kills two birds with one stone: For attentive consumers who fail to 
vaccinate because the cost (inclusive of time) exceeds their private benefit, changing the location 
of the clinic reduces their marginal cost; for inattentive consumers who fail to vaccinate because 
they forget when the flu clinic is, changing the location of the clinic provides an effective visual 
reminder to get a flu shot. 
More generally, in thinking about what types of policy tools are likely to be most 
effective at generating behavior change, a useful starting point is to examine how aligned 
individual preferences are with the socially optimal outcome. Sometimes individual preferences 
may be much closer to the social optimum than what is observed in the market. If so, there must 
be some barrier to behavior change other than the private marginal cost exceeding the private 
marginal benefit; in this case, helping individuals execute on their preferences may go a long 
way toward social efficiency. Section 3 evaluates several different types of interventions in this 
vein. If, alternatively, there is a significant wedge between what is individually and what is 
socially optimal, then there may be a role for policy in changing the cost-benefit calculation. In  
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some cases, this may be best accomplished through the traditional tools of public policy. In 
others, there may be more cost-effective approaches to increasing the private marginal benefit or 
decreasing the marginal cost to effect behavior change; behaviorally informed interventions that 
target perceived costs and benefits are examined in Section 4. But the bottom line is that in 
almost any circumstance, understanding what impedes individuals from taking a desired action 
helps inform the most productive margins along which to target a policy intervention. 
3. BEHAVIORALLY INFORMED POLICY TOOLS TO HELP AGENTS EXECUTE 
THEIR PREFERENCES 
As suggested in the preceding section, in some cases in which markets yield inefficient 
outcomes, market participants may in fact have interests that are aligned (or more aligned) with 
social optimality but may simply fail to execute on their preferences. For example, individuals 
may want to get a flu shot, or vote in the next election, or save more, or eat a healthier diet, or 
exercise more, or reduce their home energy consumption but may fail to follow through on their 
intentions for a variety of reasons, including present bias, the complexity of the task at hand, 
inattention, and temptation. Research has evaluated several different types of interventions 
designed to help individuals carry out the intentions they themselves have, many of which have 
been or could be fruitfully incorporated into public policy. 
The intervention that has received perhaps the most attention in academic, media, and 
policy circles is changing the default option—the outcome that happens if agents do nothing. In 
standard economic models, as long as transaction costs are small, defaults should have little 
impact on economic outcomes; agents will opt out of any default that is not consistent with their 
preferences. In practice, however, defaults can significantly impact outcomes, even in domains in 
which the outcome is consequential (financially or otherwise) and even when the direct  
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transaction costs of opting out of the default are small. One such domain is savings. In the United 
States, savings plan participation rates are substantially higher when the default is automatic 
enrollment in the savings plan (i.e., individuals must opt out if they prefer not to save) than they 
are when individuals must take action to participate in the savings plan. In the first study of the 
impact of automatic enrollment on savings outcomes, Madrian & Shea (2001) document a 50–
percentage point increase in savings plan participation for newly hired employees at a large 
employer that switched from an opt-in to an opt-out automatic enrollment regime. Other 
subsequent studies document similar participation rate increases (Choi et al. 2004, 2006; 
Beshears et al. 2008; Vanguard Group 2013). In related research, Thaler & Benartzi (2004) show 
that enrolling individuals in a program that automatically increases savings plan contributions 
each year substantially raises deferrals over a four-year period. 
These findings have motivated several policy reforms to increase retirement savings. In 
the United States, the Pension Protection Act of 2006 incorporated provisions to encourage 
employer adoption of automatic enrollment with automatic contribution escalation (see Beshears 
et al. 2010 for a discussion of how economic research influenced this legislation). In 2007, New 
Zealand implemented KiwiSaver, a program that automatically enrolls employees into a national 
savings plan (see Toder & Khitatrakun 2006). And recent pension reform legislation in the 
United Kingdom requires firms to automatically enroll employees in occupational pensions (see 
UK Department for Work and Pensions 2012).  
Although automatic enrollment leads to unambiguous increases in savings plan 
participation, its effects on asset accumulation and social welfare are less certain. First, the 
savings plan contribution rate set as the default under automatic enrollment is extremely 
persistent so that asset accumulation is very dependent on whether the default contribution rate is  
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set high or low.
2 In the United States, most employer savings plans with automatic enrollment 
have a low default contribution rate of 2–4% of pay. The default contribution in New Zealand’s 
KiwiSaver program is 3%. Research suggests that some individuals who persist at these low 
default contribution rates would have chosen a higher savings rate in the absence of automatic 
enrollment (Madrian & Shea 2001, Choi et al. 2004). Thus, although automatic enrollment 
increases asset accumulation within the plan for individuals who would otherwise have been 
nonparticipants, it may have the perverse effect of lowering asset accumulation for some 
individuals who would have saved on their own at a contribution rate higher than the default in 
the absence of automatic enrollment (those who do not opt out of the default contribution rate). 
Second, the increased asset accumulation in savings plans subject to automatic enrollment could 
be offset by leakage from the savings plan before retirement, by lower savings elsewhere, or by 
increased household debt. There is little evidence on the magnitude of these potential offsets, 
although a recent study by Chetty et al. (2014) on the impact of a short-term mandatory savings 
program in Denmark suggests that the extent of crowd out for that program was quite limited. 
Finally, automatic enrollment may induce some individuals to save who might actually be worse 
off as a result. 
A second policy-relevant domain in which defaults have significantly impacted outcomes 
is organ donation (Johnson & Goldstein 2003). In many countries, individuals must sign up to be 
potential organ donors at their death (informed consent), and as with savings plan participation 
rates when individual must opt in, the fraction of people who sign up to be organ donors is 
relatively low. Other countries have a system of presumed consent (individuals must opt out if 
they do not wish to be organ donors), and in these countries, the fraction of people who opt out 
                                                 
2 There is substantial persistence and the default asset allocation as well.	 ﾠ 
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of organ donation is extremely low. Abadie & Gay (2006) show that actual organ donation rates 
are 25-30 percentage points higher in presumed-consent countries relative to informed-consent 
countries, a finding that has precipitated calls for a switch from informed to presumed consent in 
the former countries. 
Although savings and organ donation are the domains in which defaults have received the 
most attention, there are several other policy-relevant domains in which defaults impact 
outcomes. In the health arena, influenza vaccines are an intervention for which the estimated 
benefits exceed the costs of provision (see Nichol et al. 1994, Wilde et al. 1999), yet vaccination 
rates are well below recommended guidelines. Chapman et al. (2010) estimate that giving 
individuals a default flu shot appointment time increases vaccination rates by 12 percentage 
points relative to a baseline vaccination rate of 33%. In the domain of household finance, 
defaults have been found to impact payday loan repayment. In Colorado, 86% of payday 
borrowers follow the default option of a 180-day installment loan after their initial loan term, 
relative to only 10% in Washington, where an installment loan is merely an option rather than a 
default (Pew Charit. Trusts 2013). Motivated by a desire to reduce consumer use of expensive 
overdraft coverage, the 2009 CARD Act mandates that financial institutions require consumers 
to proactively opt in to overlimit coverage on debit and credit card accounts rather than opt out, 
which had been the prevailing norm. Defaults also impact environmental conservation outcomes; 
Sunstein (2013b) cites dramatic differences in green energy use in German cities where 
consumers must opt in versus opt out of purchasing their energy from so-called green sources. 
Despite the large body of evidence that defaults impact economically important 
outcomes, the academic literature has given little consideration to what constitutes an optimal 
default. Under what conditions is presumed consent socially preferable to informed consent? Do  
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the benefits of higher influenza vaccination rates when individuals are given a default 
appointment outweigh the costs that accrue when the majority of such individuals fail to show up 
or cancel their appointment? Should the default contribution rate in a savings plan with 
automatic enrollment be high or low? And how does changing the default compare to other 
policy options that could be used to change behavior? Characterizing the nature of optimal 
defaults is a worthy area of future research. 
Carroll et al. (2009) posit that in the case of substantial heterogeneity in consumer 
preferences, specifying a default may be suboptimal because any default is unlikely to align well 
with consumer preferences for more than a small minority of individuals. If present bias is an 
important barrier to consumers’ implementing their preferences in the presence of heterogeneity, 
one intervention that counters procrastination while respecting the diversity of preferences is to 
require an active choice. In the savings domain, Carroll et al. (2009) compare the outcomes in an 
employer-sponsored savings plan before and after employees were compelled to make an active 
choice about whether to participate. They find that when not required to make a choice (opt in), 
only 41% of newly hired employees enrolled in the savings plan. In contrast, when required to 
make an active choice about savings plan participation (which could include not participating in 
the savings plan), 69% enrolled. The 28–percentage point increase in savings plan participation, 
although not as large as the effects estimated from moving from opt-in to opt-out enrollment, 
preserves greater heterogeneity in savings plan contribution rates than does automatic 
enrollment, which tends to corral participants into the contribution rate specified as the default. 
In the domain of health, in which there is likely to be substantial preference heterogeneity, 
Beshears et al. (2013a) examine an active choice mechanism to initiate home delivery for long-
term prescription drug medications. Under an opt-in regime, take-up of home delivery is low,  
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around 6% of those eligible. The adoption of an active choice approach leads to a sizeable 35–
percentage point increase in home delivery adoption. Because home delivery is cheaper than 
retail pharmacy pick up for many drugs, the switch from retail pick up to home delivery leads to 
a meaningful reduction in prescription drug expenditures. Similarly, Keller et al. (2011) find that 
requiring an active choice leads to substantive increases in enrollment in an automatic 
prescription drug refill program. Active choice has been advocated as a way to increase consent 
rates for organ donation (Spital 1995) and has been implemented with some success on this front 
in the United Kingdom, California, and Texas as a part of the driver’s licensing process (see 
http://nudges.org/tag/organ-donation/ ). 
Interventions involving active choice forestall procrastination by requiring (or strongly 
encouraging) individuals to make a decision. A related idea is to constrain the time window in 
which individuals can take action without necessarily requiring a choice. O’Donoghue & Rabin 
(1999) suggest such an approach as a way to encourage timely retirement savings plan 
investment reallocation; similarly, Johnson et al. (2012) propose using time-limited windows for 
policy initiatives such as home energy-efficiency improvement tax credits. 
One factor that may generate procrastination in the execution of personally and socially 
desirable behaviors is the complexity of the task involved. If complexity is the barrier to action, 
then a natural solution is to simplify the task at hand. One example that has received a fair 
amount of attention is the process of applying for college financial aid in the United States 
(Dynarski & Scott-Clayton 2006). Until fairly recently, the gateway to financial aid, the FAFSA 
form, was eight pages long and included over 100 questions. As a consequence, a sizeable 
fraction of eligible students did not even bother to apply for financial aid. Bettinger et al. (2012) 
study a field experiment designed to simplify the financial aid application process by having paid  
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tax preparers help individuals complete the FAFSA form at the time when applicants file their 
federal taxes. They find that this approach to simplifying the aid application process increases 
the fraction of targeted families with high school seniors who apply for college financial aid by 
16 percentage points; it also increases the fraction of children who actually attend college by 7 
percentage points. The effects of this relatively inexpensive intervention are large relative to the 
estimated effects of changing the price of college (Hansen 1983; Kane 1995; Dynarski 2000, 
2003; Seftor & Turner 2002). The US Department of Education has subsequently implemented 
its own efforts to simplify the financial aid application process. 
Hastings & Weinstein (2008) study the impact of simplifying information provision on 
school choice outcomes in the Charlotte-Mecklenberg school district, which implemented a 
school choice program in 2002. Initially, the information provided to facilitate choice was 
unwieldy—more than 100 pages of descriptions provided by the schools with no objective data 
and no tools to facilitate direct comparisons. The district eventually moved to providing families 
with a much shorter, three-page list of test scores sorted alphabetically and subsequently 
cooperated in a field experiment to test the provision of an even simpler one-page information 
sheet with test score data confined only to schools relevant to each student. Hastings & 
Weinstein (2008) estimate a sizeable 5– to 7–percentage point increase in the fraction of families 
choosing a nonguaranteed school in response to simplified information provision (although they 
find no difference between the three- and one-page information disclosures); importantly, the 
parents who exercise the choice option also choose better-performing schools when they receive 
the simplified disclosures. 
Simplification is an approach that has also been successfully applied to increase savings 
plan participation and contribution rates. The essence of these interventions is to send individuals  
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a simple form with a single box and instructions to “check here” to initiate participation in the 
savings plan at a prespecified default contribution rate and asset allocation or, in a separate form, 
to increase savings plan contributions to the match threshold in the plan. Choi et al. (2010)] and 
Beshears et al. (2013b) find an approximately 10–percentage point increase in the targeted 
behaviors in response to the simplified enrollment and contribution rate change campaigns. 
Moreover, they find that these effects diminish only somewhat over time so that repeated 
simplified messaging results in even larger increases accumulated over time. 
In the book Simpler, Sunstein (2013a) articulates many ways that the US federal 
government used behavioral insights to streamline and simplify government regulation under the 
Obama administration’s first term. The tax code, unfortunately, is one area that was not 
successfully reformed with an eye toward simplification, although many have called for such 
changes.
3 Other countries are following suit in simplifying regulation. For example, Mexico 
recently restricted the types of fees that investment providers in its privatized social security 
system are allowed to charge in an attempt to facilitate easier comparison of the fees being 
charged and thereby stimulate greater market competition between investment providers to lower 
fees (Duarte & Hastings 2012). 
Complexity has also been cited as a potential explanation for low take-up among those 
eligible for social safety net programs such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, 
Supplemental Security Income, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, and the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC).  Bhargava & Manoli (2011) ran a field experiment in conjunction 
with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to evaluate the effectiveness of different approaches to 
communicating EITC eligibility to taxpayers who did not claim the EITC but appeared eligible. 
                                                 
3 Readers are referred to the recommendations of The President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (2005) as 
just one example of many calling for a simpler US federal tax code.  
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The most effective intervention studied was replacing the standard IRS mailing with one that 
incorporated a simplified message about potential eligibility and a simplified worksheet for 
calculating the potential amount of the credit. This approach increased EITC take-up by 10 
percentage points relative to a baseline take-up rate of 16% among those who received the 
traditional IRS notices. 
Note that there is a fundamental tension in simplifying the process for obtaining 
government aid. On the one hand, a complicated procedure creates a hassle cost that will ideally 
reduce the incentives to feign eligibility by those who are not (Nichols & Zeckhauser 1982); on 
the other hand, a complicated procedure also creates a hassle cost for those who are eligible, 
leading many eligible not to apply, with potential implications for their economic well-being as 
well as for program costs. The policy tool then is best characterized as the level of procedural 
complexity, which can be set high or low to achieve different policy outcomes. 
The three types of interventions discussed above—changing the default, requiring an 
active choice, and simplifying—are examples of what Thaler & Sunstein (2008) call choice 
architecture, the design of the environment in which people make choices. There are several 
additional choice architecture tools that policy makers can use to facilitate decision making that 
better aligns outcomes with consumer preferences (see Thaler & Sunstein 2008 and Johnson et 
al. 2012 for longer treatments on the tools of choice architecture). These include the following: 
•  A reduced number of options in a choice set. Toffler (1970) coined the phrase choice 
overload to describe the effects of having too many options from which to choose. These 
effects include procrastination, avoidance, dissatisfaction, reliance on imperfect 
heuristics, and potentially mistakes.  
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•  Decision aids. When choice is complicated, giving individuals access to tools or decision 
aids to facilitate the selection of the best option from a larger choice set can improve 
choice outcomes. Many popular websites (Amazon, Netflix, Google) use complicated 
algorithms to predict which options will be of most interest to consumers, but such 
approaches have relevance in the policy domain as well. For example, the Medicare.gov 
Medicare Plan Finder, which is designed to help seniors select the most appropriate 
prescription drug plan, is one example of such a tool in the policy domain of health.
4 
•  Personalized information. When the optimality of a specific option depends on individual 
attributes of a given consumer, providing personalized information specific to the choice 
context can improve decision outcomes. For example, Kling et al. (2012) find that 
providing seniors with individualized information on lower-cost Medicare Part D 
prescription drug plans induces greater switching to a lower-cost plan (an 11–percentage 
point increase) than providing generic information about the opportunity to switch drug 
plans (and results in lower expected costs to consumers as well). 
•  The presentation of attributes in a way that facilitates informed consumer decision 
making. Larrick & Soll (2008) show that consumers make more accurate decisions about 
automobile fuel savings when fuel efficiency is expressed as gallons per 100 miles than 
with the more traditional miles per gallon measure (the so-called MPG illusion). This is 
because the relationship between gallons per mile (the measure that matters for 
determining relative fuel efficiency) and miles per gallon (the measure that matters if you 
want to know how far you can drive on a full tank of gas) is nonlinear, and consumers do 
poorly in evaluating nonlinear relationships. The US Environmental Protection Agency 
                                                 
4 Health care is a domain that has seen the development of several decision aids designed to help consumers make 
better informed choices about their medical treatment. Ubel (2013) discusses the inherent difficulties in assessing 
the effectiveness of the many decision aids in this context.  
21 
has recently revised its fuel economy labeling requirements to increase the prominence of 
expected annual fuel expenditures to help facilitate better fuel economy comparisons. 
Stango & Zinman (2009) show a related phenomenon in household financial decision 
making: Individuals linearize exponential functions, which leads them to underappreciate 
the cumulative interest costs of long-term debt and the long-term gains from savings due 
to compounding. The CARD Act of 2009 mandates changes in credit card statements to 
help consumers better recognize the costs of debt: Financial institutions must report the 
time it would take to pay off a credit card balance if making only the minimum monthly 
payment as well as the monthly payment required to pay off the balance in three years. 
•  Standardized options to increase comparability. Gabaix & Laibson (2006) posit that firms 
engage in intentional obfuscation of relevant product attributes to reduce the ability of 
consumers to directly compare the costs and benefits of different options (shrouded 
attributes). This obfuscation can be a source of market power to firms and can also 
increase the likelihood that consumers make mistakes in their decision making. One 
regulatory approach to facilitate comparison shopping is to standardize product attributes. 
For example, supplemental Medigap insurance coverage for senior citizens must conform 
to one of 10 profiles (denominated with letters of the alphabet) delineated by the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 
•  Feedback. For some decisions, consumers may have difficulty linking their actions with 
the outcomes they experience and the outcomes they desire. For example, consumers may 
see their monthly utility bills and have little understanding about which behaviors will be 
most cost-effective in reducing future energy consumption. One approach in such settings 
is to provide better feedback about the link between actions and outcomes. Darby (2006)  
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reviews the literature on providing consumers with feedback on home energy 
consumption. In general, the studies suggest that direct feedback (e.g., a real-time energy 
use display monitor) reduces energy consumption by 5–15%, whereas indirect feedback 
(e.g., better information on energy consumption as part of the monthly bill) reduces 
energy consumption by 0–10%. 
Commitment devices represent another category of interventions that can help individuals 
execute their preferences in contexts in which they are likely to succumb to temptations that 
generate short-run benefits that are outweighed by longer-term costs.
5 In the most influential 
paper in the literature on commitment devices, Ashraf et al. (2006) evaluate a field experiment 
that offered a commitment savings account to clients of a local bank in the Philippines. 
Participating clients who opted for the commitment savings product voluntarily restricted their 
right to withdraw their savings until reaching either an individually chosen goal date or an 
individually chosen goal amount. Relative to a control group not offered the commitment savings 
product, those offered the commitment account had bank balances that were 82% higher 12 
months later. Corroborating work on commitment savings products in other countries includes 
Gugerty (2007), Ashraf et al. (2011), Brune et al. (2011), and Dupas & Robinson (2013). This 
research provides a rationalization for restrictions on the ability to access retirement savings 
account balances before reaching retirement age. 
Soman & Cheema (2011) evaluate an interesting variant of a commitment savings 
technology in a field experiment targeted at unbanked construction laborers in rural India who 
are paid cash wages. Individuals earmarked a certain amount of their weekly wages as savings 
                                                 
5 Readers are referred to Bryan et al. (2010) for a review of the literature on the theoretical motivations for 
commitment devices, the experimental and field evidence on the demand for commitment, and the impact of 
commitment devices on outcomes. 
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that was then set aside in either one (nonpartitioned) or two (partitioned) sealed envelopes. 
Realized savings was 39–216% higher for workers whose savings were partitioned into two 
envelopes rather than put all into one envelope. The authors hypothesize that opening a savings 
envelope, or violating the partition, induces guilt. Having multiple accounts, or partitions, 
increases the psychological cost of spending money set aside for a specific purpose and 
consequently increased the amount saved. The results of this study suggest that having multiple 
purpose-specific savings accounts may be a more effective way to encourage savings than 
having individuals rely on multipurpose savings accounts (e.g., having both a retirement income 
account and a retirement health account may induce higher savings than a single generic 
retirement account). 
Agricultural productivity is another policy domain in which commitment products have 
policy relevance. Duflo et al. (2011) study several approaches to increasing fertilizer use by 
farmers in rural Kenya. The context is interesting because there are clear benefits to fertilizer 
usage, and most farmers understand these benefits and plan to use fertilizer, yet only a minority 
do so, citing limited financial resources when the time comes to apply fertilizer. Some farmers 
were given the opportunity to prepay for the next season’s fertilizer at the end of this season’s 
harvest when financial constraints are less binding, essentially precommitting to fertilizer usage 
by prepaying. Fertilizer utilization the next season was approximately 20 percentage points 
higher for those offered the prepay option relative to farmers in a control group; fertilizer 
utilization was also higher relative to famers who were offered a price subsidy in the next season 
(but not the option to prepay at the end of the previous season’s harvest). These results suggest 
both that there is a demand for commitment and that commitment devices can result in 
meaningful changes in behavior.  
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Research in psychology has identified a lack of planning as another barrier that impedes 
individuals from executing on their preferences (Gollwitzer 1999, Gollwitzer & Sheeran 2006). 
Without a plan for implementation, individuals who face competing demands for their attention 
are prone to forget what it is they wanted to do. Encouraging people to form a plan to carry out 
their intentions has been shown to increase the attainment of desired goals in a variety of policy-
relevant domains.
6 For example, Lusardi et al. (2009) study the impact of helping employees 
form and implement a savings plan through the provision of a planning aid that (a) encourages 
individuals to set aside a specific time for enrolling in their savings plan, (b) outlines the steps 
involved in enrolling in a savings plan (e.g., choosing a contribution rate and an asset allocation), 
(c) gives an approximation of the time each step will take, and (d) provides tips on what to do if 
individuals get stuck. This planning aid increased enrollment in the studied employer-sponsored 
savings plan by 12–21 percentage points for newly hired employees. 
Nickerson & Rogers (2010) evaluate the effectiveness of prompting individuals to make a 
concrete voting plan by asking them a series of questions: (a) “Around what time do you expect 
to head to the polls on Tuesday?” (b) “Where do you expect you will be coming from when you 
head to the polls on Tuesday?” (c) “What do you think you will be doing before you head out to 
the polls?” They find a 9–percentage point increase in voter turnout among voters from single-
voter households, who they posit are less likely to have other support mechanisms in place to 
encourage voting (this effect is more than twice as large as the next best get-out-the-vote script); 
they find no effect of this intervention among individuals in multivoter households, presumably 
because, in these households, individuals encourage and remind each other to vote and 
effectively substitute for the formal planning prompt. In the health domain, Milkman et al. 
                                                 
6 Readers are referred to Rogers et al. (2013) for a review of the literature on implementation intentions (planning) 
and a discussion of the psychology around how plan making impacts behavioral outcomes.	 ﾠ 
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(2011) evaluate the impact of prompting employees to make a concrete plan for the date and time 
they will get a seasonal flu shot and find a 4–percentage point increase in vaccination rates 
relative to a baseline rate of 33% among members of the control group. Other studies similarly 
find that prompting individuals to make a plan increases the frequency of other prompted health 
behaviors, including tetanus shots (Leventhal  et al. 1965), cancer screening (Sheeran & Orbell 
2000), healthy eating (Gollwitzer & Sheeran 2006), colonoscopy (Milkman et al. 2013), and 
mammography (Rutter et al. 2006). In the educational domain, Duckworth et al. (2011) show 
that having an implementation plan increases the test preparation efforts of high school students. 
From a policy standpoint, these types of interventions have the attractive feature that they are 
low cost so that even if their effects on behavior are modest, they may rank highly on the basis of 
cost-effectiveness relative to other potential interventions. Such interventions could be effective 
at encouraging a variety of other socially desirable behaviors, such as purchasing life insurance, 
procuring a will, or switching to energy-efficient light bulbs. 
A natural complement to planning aids is the provision of reminders to follow through on 
a desired course of action. Both planning prompts and reminders are extremely low cost and 
scalable interventions that address the procrastination that arises because of limited attention. 
Reminders can take a variety of forms. Austin et al. (2006) show that a verbal reminder 
immediately before entering a car increases the fraction of drivers buckling their seat belt by 25 
percentage points, whereas a reminder given several minutes beforehand has almost no impact. 
Reminder letters are among the most cost-effective ways to encourage immunization, increasing 
immunization rates by 8 percentage points on average (Briss et al. 2000, Szilagyi et al. 2000). 
Reminders have also been effective at encouraging savings. Karlan et al. (2013) evaluate the 
impact of providing reminders, either text messages or letters, on savings goal attainment in  
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Bolivia, Peru, and the Philippines. They find that reminders increase the likelihood that 
individuals achieve their savings goals by 3 percentage points and increase the amount saved by 
6 percentage points. Similarly, in a savings field experiment conducted in Chile, Kast et al. 
(2012) find that individuals who received text message reminders saved substantially more than 
individuals who did not. Soman & Cheema (2011) study visual reminders; they find that low-
income laborers in India saved 15% more when the envelope with their earmarked savings was 
covered with a picture of their children than when it had no picture. A combination of planning 
aids and reminders could be an effective way to encourage more active job seeking for workers 
who have lost a job or to encourage more environmentally conscious behavior on the part of 
consumers. 
4. BEHAVIORALLY INFORMED POLICY TOOLS TO CHANGE HOW INDIVIDUALS 
EVALUATE COSTS AND BENEFITS 
The preceding section of the article focuses on interventions to help individuals execute 
their preferences that may be aligned with, or are closer to, socially optimal outcomes than what 
may be observed in the market. Sometimes, however, individual preferences do not align with 
socially optimal outcomes. In these cases, a different set of policy tools may be called for. As 
noted in Section 2, the tools traditionally used to change behavior are price mechanisms 
(taxes/fines to inhibit behavior or subsidies to encourage it), information provision, or regulation. 
But an understanding of psychology may help inform a set of more cost-effective mechanisms to 
change behavior than these traditional tools. The previous section discusses how choice 
architecture can be used to help individuals execute their preferences. Choice architecture can 
also be used to change how individuals evaluate the costs and benefits of different choice  
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outcomes. Alternatively, choice architecture could be viewed as a way of impacting how 
individual preferences are constructed or expressed (Payne & Bettman 1999). 
For example, one reason for the persistence of defaults noted above is that decision 
makers, unsure of the best course of action, may take the default as an implicit recommendation 
set by a benevolent planner. If so, a naïve decision maker may see little reason to move away 
from a default. The perception of an endorsement increases the perceived benefit of the default 
outcome. There is evidence that defaults do create such endorsement effects in the context of 
savings (Madrian & Shea 2001, Choi et al. 2004). 
There are several other tools of choice architecture for changing how individuals evaluate 
the costs and benefits of their actions. One insight from psychology is that individuals do not 
make absolute evaluations when making judgments. Rather, they make evaluations relative to a 
reference point. As consequence, policy can be used to help set the reference points that 
individuals use, a process called framing (Kahneman & Tversky 1984). One of the foundational 
theories in behavioral economics, prospect theory, posits that individuals are twice as sensitive to 
losses as they are to gains of an equal magnitude and that gains and losses are evaluated relative 
to an endogenously chosen reference point (Kahneman & Tversky 1979). A natural consequence 
of this theory is the possibility of influencing behavior by changing whether individuals perceive 
an outcome as a gain or a loss. One area of policy application is tax collection. A natural 
reference point for taxpayers at the time of tax filing is whether they owe additional tax (relative 
to what has already been collected) or expect a refund. Engström et al. (2013) find that in 
Sweden, taxpayers are more aggressive about claiming deductions when they owe additional tax 
at the time of filing than when they expect a refund, consistent with the predictions of prospect 
theory. An obvious policy implication is that a tax collection strategy that relies on  
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overwithholding followed by refunds at the time of tax filing may increase tax compliance and 
total taxes paid. Interventions that recognize individuals’ aversion to loss have also been studied 
in the policy domains of education (Fryer et al. 2012) and re-employment following periods of 
unemployment (Bloom et al. 2001). 
Framing need not be relative to a reference point to have an impact, as in the previous 
example. For example, Bryan et al. (2011) compare the impact of different ways of framing 
voting on turnout in two significant elections. They find that voter turnout is several percentage 
points higher when the importance of voting is framed as a noun (“to be a voter”) rather than as a 
verb (“to vote”). They posit that the noun formulation of voting invokes a valued personal 
identity and, by so doing, motivates higher turnout. One can easily imagine natural extensions to 
other policy-relevant domains: to be a saver, to be environmentally conscious, to be healthy, to 
be honest, and so on.
7 
A policy-relevant variant of framing involves the labels used to name or describe 
government programs. For example, Saez (2009) studies the impact of framing a financial 
incentive to open an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) at the time of tax filing either as a 
match or as a tax credit. This inquiry was motivated by a presumption that the Saver’s Credit, a 
feature of the US tax code designed to encourage lower-income households to save, is largely 
ineffective because people do not understand tax credits. He finds that framing the incentive as a 
match is indeed more effective; doing so results in more individuals opening an IRA and 
increases the unconditional contributions to IRA accounts. 
                                                 
7 Readers are referred to Bryan et al. (2013) for experimental evidence showing that individuals are more likely to 
cheat when dishonesty is framed in terms of cheating rather than being a cheater.  
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There has been a long literature on flypaper effects in economics—money tends to stick 
where it lands, even if it is otherwise fungible. A related finding is that how money is labeled 
also impacts how it is spent. In a policy context, the designated use of government transfers 
impacts how money is spent even if, in reality, the money is fungible. For example, Kooreman 
(2000) finds that the marginal propensity to consume children’s clothing is 10 times larger out of 
income designated as a “child benefit” than out of other income sources; in contrast, the marginal 
propensity to consume adult clothing is highly significant for other income sources but is 
negligible for income from designated child benefits. The labeling of income as a “child benefit” 
apparently creates in parents a moral obligation to actually spend that money on their children. 
Similarly, Benhassine et al. (2013) evaluate the impact on school enrollment of a labeled cash 
transfer program in Morocco that designated the funds for children’s education, although the 
funds could be used for other purposes. They find a sizeable increase in elementary school 
attendance by children in families who received the labeled cash transfer relative to children in 
control households who received nothing. They also find that a labeled cash transfer is as 
effective, indeed for some measures is more effective, at promoting school attendance than is a 
conditional cash transfer in which payments are made only if a child does in fact attend school 
(and is significantly less expensive to administer than a conditional cash transfer program). 
These results clearly suggest that careful consideration should be given to the names 
attached to any government program. For example, consider how the names of three different 
programs that direct resources toward the unemployed might impact behavior. In the United 
States, these programs are referred to as unemployment insurance, a label that reinforces a 
recipient’s status as unemployed; in contrast, in the United Kingdom, these benefits are referred 
to as a jobseeker’s allowance, a name that emphasizes a recipient’s attachment to and activity in  
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the labor force. In Australia, these benefits were for a time referred to as work for the dole, a 
label that emphasizes the receipt of government benefits and has a pejorative ring to it. 
Another application of how choice architecture can be used to change how individuals 
evaluate costs and benefits comes from the literature on ballot order and election outcomes. In 
many political jurisdictions, incumbents are listed on the ballot first. California has adopted a 
different approach to ballot order: Candidates are randomized to their position on the ballot. Ho 
& Imai (2008) use the naturally occurring variation in ballot order across the state to estimate the 
impact of ballot order on election outcomes. They find that being listed first on the ballot has an 
impact on general election outcomes only for nonpartisan candidates; ballot order has a much 
larger impact in primary elections, where all candidates benefit from being listed first, and minor 
party candidates benefit most. 
Shu et al. (2012) document another example of ordering effects. They find that asking 
consumers to sign a statement affirming that the information provided on an insurance form is 
true before filling out the form were more honest than consumers who were asked to sign the 
statement affirming their honesty after filling out the form. Yet most forms that request a 
signature affirming that the information provided is correct ask for this confirmation at the end. 
Moving the position of this signature request from the end to the beginning of the form has 
relevance in many policy areas, including tax filing and applications for a myriad of public 
assistance programs. 
The importance of order effects in the outcomes discussed above suggests that other 
structural features of choice menus may also be relevant in policy design. In the field of financial 
security, the mix of retirement investment options selected by employees is responsive to 
changes in menu design. Benartzi & Thaler (2001) find that people exhibit a bias toward  
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diversification and, in the extreme, apply a 1/N rule to decisions involving investments across an 
array of asset categories. Given that the financial impact of such a diversification bias depends 
on the mix of asset categories, employers could be encouraged by policy makers to offer 
retirement investment options that parse out favored investment categories. 
The different choices and behavior of individuals in response to ad hoc or subjective 
categorizations are also visible in the field of health. Fox et al. (2005) find that offering 
individuals a selection from multiple categories of healthy foods and only one category of 
unhealthy food increased healthy food choices when compared to offering a selection from 
multiple categories of both healthy and unhealthy foods. Positive health choices have also been 
observed in response to the structural presentation of healthy options in ways that enable their 
convenient selection. For example, featuring healthy or unhealthy sandwich options at the start 
of a menu was found to substantially alter the likelihood of choosing a healthy sandwich by 
study participants (Wisdom et al. 2010). Research conducted for the US Department of 
Agriculture suggests that government-funded nutrition programs could use packaging or other 
presentation methods to help individuals monitor and control the volume of their food 
consumption (Just et al. 2007). 
A final category of behaviorally informed interventions used to impact outcomes derives 
from the observation that individuals care not just about their own behavior in isolation, but 
rather evaluate it in a social context, that is, in terms of what others around them are doing and 
the judgments that others may pass on their behavior. For example, Gerber & Rogers (2009) 
show that voter turnout is higher when individuals are led to believe that expected voter turnout 
will be high rather than low. Similarly, Gerber et al. (2008) find that voter turnout is several 
points higher when individuals are led to believe that their neighbors will be informed ex post  
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about whether they voted. The use of social comparisons has been widely used to influence 
household behavior in the domain of energy use and the environment. Alcott (2011), Alcott & 
Rogers (2014), and Costa & Kahn (2013) examine the impact of providing consumers with 
information on their own energy consumption and that of their similarly situated neighbors. They 
all find that sending consumers home energy reports, which contain a social comparison element, 
diminishes home energy consumption.
8 Social norms have also been used to encourage tax 
compliance. In a recent test of a social norms approach to reducing tax delinquency, the UK 
Behavioral Insights Team finds that providing information to delinquent taxpayers on the 
fraction of people who pay their taxes on time increases tax compliance by almost 15 percentage 
points (Behav. Insights Team 2012). Although social norms hold some promise for changing 
behavior at relatively low cost, the effects do not always operate in the way predicted. For 
example, Beshears et al. (2013c) evaluate whether conveying social norms around savings can be 
used as a way to increase savings plan participation and contributions. They find a somewhat 
paradoxical result: Employees who received information on the fraction of their coworkers 
saving were actually less likely to save as a result. This raises questions about the contexts in 
which social norms will and will not impact consumer behavior, which is worthy of future 
research. 
5. BEHAVIORALLY INFORMED INCENTIVES 
In addition to the many nontraditional behaviorally informed policy tools for behavior 
change discussed in Sections 3 and 4, there is still a role for traditional policies such as financial 
incentives in the realm of behavior change. As noted in Section 2, if the impediment to behavior 
                                                 
8 Although the home energy reports evaluated in these studies have a social norm element, and the framing of these 
papers is largely around social norms, the home energy reports do have other elements that could contribute to 
reduced energy utilization.  
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change is that the cost of undertaking a socially desirable action exceeds the private benefit, 
incentives, either positive or negative, provide one option that can better align benefits with costs 
to make behavior change attractive. But even within the realm of incentives, there are insights 
from behavioral economics that can help inform us about when to use incentives and how to 
structure them. Kamenica (2012) provides a more comprehensive review of the literature on 
behavioral economics and incentives; I focus here on a few insights that seem particularly 
relevant for evaluating incentives as a tool for changing behavior from a public policy 
standpoint. 
Although incentives clearly have a role in economic life—many of us would not be 
working in our current jobs absent any compensation—nonfinancial incentives can be strong 
motivators in some contexts and may be less expensive than the financial incentive that would be 
required to generate a similar degree of behavior change. For example, Levitt et al. (2012) 
examine the effectiveness of several different incentive schemes to motivate student performance 
on standardized exams. They find that giving students a trophy for meeting performance targets, 
at a cost of about $3 per student, has roughly the same impact on test scores as a direct financial 
incentive of either $10 or $20, and in some cases is more effective. 
Grant & Gino (2010) study the effort of salaried employees working in a university 
development office. Some were randomized into a business-as-usual treatment arm, while others 
were randomized into an “expression of thanks” arm. Employees in both groups received daily 
feedback on the number of fundraising calls they had made; in addition, employees in the second 
condition were visited by the director of annual giving who personally thanked them for their 
efforts with the following message: “I am very grateful for your hard work. We sincerely 
appreciate your contributions to the university.” The number of phone calls made each week  
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increased by 50% for employees in the latter group after they were thanked, whereas the 
productivity of employees in the business-as-usual arm did not change over time. This study did 
not compare the impact of giving thanks with the impact of a financial incentive, but few studies 
on financial incentives in other contexts find productivity increases anywhere near this 
magnitude (and the cost of expressing thanks is virtually free). 
Not only can nonfinancial incentives serve as effective motivators in certain contexts, 
financial incentives can sometimes backfire by crowding-out intrinsic motivation. Gneezy & 
Rustichini (2000b) show that providing small incentives for behaviors that otherwise tend to 
carry some level of personal reward can reduce intrinsic motivation and lead to lower 
performance relative to having no incentive at all. In a related paper, the same authors show that 
penalizing undesired behavior can also backfire (Gneezy & Rustichini 2000a); when a daycare 
provider started issuing fines to parents for picking up their children late, the number of late pick 
ups actually increased. Evidently, attaching a price to late pick up legitimized the behavior in the 
mind of parents (as long as they were willing to pay). Similarly, Frey & Oberholzer-Gee (1997) 
find that offering compensation for prosocial behaviors that are personally costly (in their study, 
the willingness to accept having a nuclear waste repository cited locally) dramatically decreases 
civic-minded behavior. Although the message of these papers is certainly not that financial 
incentives never work, they do suggest that incentives must be approached very carefully when 
the desired behavior has a prosocial element or provides some degree of intrinsic motivation. 
Nonetheless, money may be a powerful motivator in many contexts. Lacetera et al. 
(2014) evaluate a large-scale field experiment that provided varying levels of compensation to 
donate blood. They find that donation rates increase with the size of the financial incentive. But 
consistent with the research on intrinsic motivation and incentives, they find that for individuals  
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unaware of the reward when they showed up to donate blood, subsequent donation rates are 
lower relative to the case when there is no reward. In a study comparing financial and 
nonfinancial incentives, Just & Price (2014) evaluate a set of interventions around motivating 
elementary school children to eat more fruits and vegetables at lunch. Children in some schools 
were offered a financial incentive (25 cents) each day they consumed a fruit or vegetable, while 
children in other schools were given a lottery ticket entitling the winner to a tangible prize of 
roughly equivalent expected value. In this study, the quarter was more motivating than the 
chance to win a prize, although it is impossible to know whether the prize was less motivating 
because the students perceived it as being less valuable or because the uncertainty about whether 
the students would receive a prize made it less attractive. 
In contexts in which incentives are a potentially cost-effective approach to change 
behavior, behavioral economics can inform us how to design incentives to make them maximally 
effective. For example, lottery-like incentives such as the one discussed above may actually be 
more motivating than linear financial rewards because individuals tend to overweight small 
probabilities and underweight larger probabilities in their decision making (this is referred to as 
probability weighting in the prospect theory model of Kahneman & Tversky 1979). The 
implication is that if there are two payments of equivalent expected value, a small guaranteed 
payment and a much larger uncertain amount with a low probability of payment, the latter will 
be preferred because individuals overweight the low probability of the uncertain payout and act 
as if it has a higher expected value. In the health domain, lottery-based incentive schemes have 
been studied as inducements for weight loss (Volpp et al. 2008a), medication adherence (Volpp 
et al. 2008b), and blood donation (Goette & Stutzer 2008). The results indicate that lottery-based 
incentives generate greater compliance with the motivated behavior than the absence of an  
36 
incentive, although none of these studies includes a linear payment condition; as a result, a 
comparison between lottery-based incentives and linear incentives with the same expected value 
cannot be made. Prospect theory probability weighting is also the motivation behind prize-linked 
savings products that are generally illegal in the United States but that have a long history and 
some popularity in other counties where they are allowed (Kearney et al. 2010). Whether prize-
linked savings products actually increase savings is an open empirical question, although one 
recent paper finds suggestive evidence from a laboratory experiment that lottery-like payouts 
lead to greater consumption deferrals than do standard linear interest rates (Filiz-Ozbay et al. 
2013). 
The timing of incentive payments can also impact their effectiveness in motivating 
behavior change, more so than would be implied by standard discounting. If individuals have 
present bias, temporally proximate incentives will have a much greater impact than those in the 
future. Just & Price (2014) find that elementary school students are much more likely to eat a 
fruit or vegetable at lunch if offered an immediate incentive for doing so (a quarter today) 
relative to a slightly delayed incentive (a quarter in two weeks). Similarly, List et al. (2012) 
compare immediate versus delayed incentives for students’ exam performance and find that 
exam performance improves when students are offered an immediate incentive, but delayed 
incentives have no impact at all. The delayed payment of incentives could help explain why 
some studies of student incentives for school performance find almost no effect on outcomes 
(e.g., Fryer 2011). These findings also suggest that providing incentives for certain behaviors 
through the tax code, which almost necessitates a temporal delay, may not be the most cost-
effective approach to providing financial motivation.  
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Another factor that can impact the effectiveness of incentives is whether they are 
structured such that they are perceived as a gain or as a loss. Levitt et al. (2012) find that student 
incentives for test performance are more effective using a loss framing (students are given the 
reward and then told they will have to give it back if performance is inadequate) than a gain 
framing (students are told that if exam performance is adequate, they will receive a reward). 
Similarly, Fryer et al. (2012) compare the effectiveness of financial incentives to teachers for 
improving student exam performance using a gain framing (the incentive is paid to teachers at 
the end of the school year after student performance on the incentivized test has been measured) 
versus a loss framing (the incentive is paid to all teachers at the start of the school year, and 
teachers are told that they will be required to return the payment at the end of the school year if 
student exam performance targets are not met). They find that structuring the teacher 
performance incentive as a loss if targets are not met is almost twice as effective at raising exam 
performance as structuring the incentive as a gain. 
For socially desirable outcomes that are the result of a complicated production process 
(e.g., education), another important factor in the design of an incentive scheme is the behavior or 
outcome to which the incentive is tied. Two studies on incentives in education in developing 
countries where pervasive teacher absenteeism is a significant impediment to educational 
improvement provide an interesting contrast in how to approach this issue. Duflo et al. (2012) 
study an incentive scheme in India that tied teacher pay to the number of days actually spent in 
the classroom each month rather than guaranteeing teachers a fixed monthly salary. They find a 
21–percentage point decrease in teacher absenteeism with the incentive scheme compared to the 
fixed salary. In addition, higher teacher attendance also translated into improved test scores. 
Glewwe et al. (2010) study a teacher incentive scheme in Kenya where teacher absenteeism is  
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also a problem. The scheme provided incentives to teachers for raising student test performance 
on a specific exam. They find increased student performance on the incentivized exam, but no 
better student performance on exams not tied to any incentive, and no change in teacher 
attendance, homework, or other pedagogy practices. The conclusion is that teachers are teaching 
to the test or perhaps, more precisely, are channeling effort only into those activities that directly 
impact their incentive payments. Although these studies are only two in a long literature on 
incentives in education and other domains, they suggest that incentives work better when tied to 
behaviors that directly impact the outcome desired. 
Overall, financial incentives appear to work best at motivating behavior change if they 
are simple, tied to controllable outcomes, the outcome matters, and the incentives reinforce what 
individuals already want to do. Incentives work less well when the structure of the incentive is 
complicated and when the link between effort and outcomes is less clear (the multitasking 
problem). And in some cases, incentives can backfire because they are too low or because they 
crowd out intrinsic motivation. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This article evaluates the implications of behavioral economics for the design of policy 
solutions to remedy market failures, redistribute resources, and collect tax revenue. There are at 
least three substantive insights that come from reviewing the behavioral economics literature as 
it relates to public policy. First, the psychological biases of consumers can generate market 
inefficiencies beyond the traditional taxonomy of market failures. Second, the effectiveness of 
traditional policy tools may be impacted by psychological considerations. And third, an 
understanding of psychology can expand the scope of policy tools available to remedy market 
failures, redistribute resources, and collect government revenue.  
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One policy domain long encouraged by traditional policy tools and more recently by 
behaviorally informed policy tools is retirement savings. Public policy has historically promoted 
private saving for retirement using financial incentives. In the United States, the primary 
inducement to save is the exemption of retirement savings plan contributions (up to a limit) from 
taxable income. The Joint Committee on Taxation places the magnitude of this tax expenditure 
in 2014 at $127.2 billion annually (Joint Comm. Tax. 2013). Lower-income taxpayers are also 
eligible for a refundable tax credit, the Saver’s Credit, as a further enticement to save. In 
addition, public policy encourages employers who sponsor retirement savings plans to provide 
their own financial inducements for employees to save, namely the provision of an employer 
match. 
A large body of literature has examined the price elasticity of savings. A rather consistent 
finding from this literature is that the behavioral response to changes in the price of saving is not 
particularly large. Madrian (2013) surveys the literature on the impact of one kind of financial 
incentive, matching, on savings plan participation and contributions. The studies using the most 
credible empirical methods find strikingly similar results in a variety of different contexts using a 
variety of different data sources: A matching contribution of 25% increases savings plan 
participation by roughly 5 percentage points. In statistical parlance, although the matching 
contribution t-statistic is significant, its partial R
2 is small. 
The relatively small impact of financial incentives on savings plan participation suggests 
that a failure to save is not primarily the result of inadequate financial incentives. Rather, there 
are other barriers to saving not accounted for by traditional economic models and not addressed 
by traditional policy solutions. The literature on behavioral economics and savings outcomes 
points to a myriad of psychological frictions that impede savings, including present bias,  
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complexity, inattention, and temptation. In many cases, countering these frictions leads to 
increases in savings plan participation and asset accumulation that surpass the effects of a 
matching contribution alone. This article reviews several behaviorally informed interventions to 
encourage increased savings that have a greater impact on savings outcomes than do financial 
incentives: providing defaults (automatic enrollment and contribution escalation), requiring an 
active choice, simplifying the enrollment process, providing individuals with planning aids, 
making commitment savings products available, and dividing savings into different partitions. A 
final behaviorally informed intervention—reminders—has a similar impact to providing 
financial incentives but is virtually free. All these interventions can be implemented at relatively 
low cost, at least in comparison to the financial incentive that would be required to generate the 
same degree of behavior change. 
The example of savings shows the power of behavioral economics to help shape more 
cost-effective policy solutions. Savings is but one of the many domains discussed in this article 
in which behavioral economics has had, or has the potential to have, an impact on consequential 
policy outcomes. An important question for policy design is assessing which interventions, 
whether traditional or behaviorally informed, are most appropriate in which contexts. Several 
context-specific factors warrant consideration in such an analysis. 
In some contexts, individual preferences may be aligned with what is socially optimal, 
but individuals may have trouble executing those preferences. If this is true across the board, 
then policy interventions that move individuals in the direction of what is both individually and 
socially optimal can be Pareto improving—they can make everyone better off without making 
anyone worse off. Such interventions can be judged by their cost-effectiveness—how much bang 
for the buck do they deliver? Similarly, individual behavior may be privately optimal but may  
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deviate from what is socially optimal in a fairly uniform fashion. For example, everyone may 
engage too much in activities that generate negative externalities (e.g., pollution) and too little in 
activities that generate positive externalities (e.g., vaccinations). In this case as well, policy 
interventions that move individuals in the direction of what is socially optimal can improve 
social welfare and can be judged by their cost-effectiveness. 
The most interesting set of contexts involves those where there is heterogeneity in the 
extent to which individual outcomes deviate from what is individual and/or socially optimal. For 
example, some individuals may be saving at a socially optimal level, while others may be saving 
too little. In these situations, policy interventions may generate distributional effects that warrant 
consideration. Of particular concern is the potential that a policy intervention may in fact cause 
harm to some individuals. For example, one criticism of using a change in the default to 
influence outcomes is that many individuals tend to persist at the default option. Indeed, it is this 
feature of defaults that makes them so attractive from the perspective of trying to effect behavior 
change. If those for whom the default is socially optimal persist at the default, while those for 
whom it is not opt out, there may be little cause for concern. But it may be that the default 
outcome is most persistent for those who are least well informed, and as a result, individuals for 
whom it is not appropriate could be made worse off. 
The interventions enumerated in this article vary in their potential to do harm. Some seem 
unlikely candidates to reduce welfare for anyone: providing individualized information, giving 
feedback about the relationship between behavior and observed outcomes (e.g., energy 
consumption), and presenting attributes in a way that facilitates informed decision making. 
Others have a greater potential for harm: changing the default option, framing, introducing social 
influence, and providing commitment devices. When interventions have a heterogeneous impact,  
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and there is potential for harm, the benefits to individuals who are made better off must be 
weighed against the costs to those who are harmed in determining which interventions have the 
greatest impact on overall social welfare. In assessing the scope for harm, an important 
possibility is that the loss function may not be symmetric. For example, the harm from donating 
the body organs of a deceased individual whose family is opposed to organ donation may differ 
from (and likely exceed) the harm of not donating the body organs of a deceased individual 
whose family supports organ donation. A different set of policy tools may be called for in 
contexts in which there is little scope for harm or the scope for harm is limited relative to 
contexts in which the scope for harm is more sizeable, in terms of either the number of 
individuals affected or the magnitude of the harm to those hurt. 
Although this article cites many examples of behaviorally informed interventions that have had 
an impact on policy-relevant outcomes, there are still many fruitful directions for future research 
in this area. First, we need more evidence comparing different behaviorally informed policies to 
each other and to the traditional tools of public policy. Second, we need more theoretical and 
empirical research into the contexts that best lend themselves to different types of interventions 
(e.g., when is a default preferable to using social influence and vice versa). Relatedly, we need 
more research on the contexts in which behaviorally informed interventions work well, do not 
work at all, or can actually backfire. Third, we need more research into the long-term impacts of 
behaviorally informed policy interventions. To what extent do the (mostly) short-term effects 
documented in the existing literature persist, and to what extent are they undone or attenuated 
with time?
9 Finally, we need more research calibrating the impact of behaviorally informed 
interventions to the benchmark of social optimality rather than to the status quo. This of course 
                                                 
9 Readers are referred to Rogers & Frey (2014) for a framework for thinking about short-term versus persistent 
changes in behavior.  
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requires taking a stand on what is socially optimal, a task that admittedly is easier said than done. 
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